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Squaring the Circle?
Independence and Impartiality of
Party-Appointed Adjudicators in

International Legal Proceedings
YUVAL SHANY*

The notions of judicial independence and impartiality were
originally developed in light of national and international judges
serving on permanent courts.' Two recent cases illustrate once
more the inherent probl~matique of applying these notions to
party-appointed adjudicators-that is, to party-appointed
arbitrators and ad hoc judges in international courts.2 These cases
involved challenges to party-appointed arbitrators.' Since partyappointed adjudicators are often expected to be sympathetic to the
positions of the party designating them, the very concept of partyappointed adjudicators may be anathematic to traditional notions
of judicial impartiality.4 This problem is further compounded by
the tendency of parties to select arbitrators with whom they had
Hersch Lauterpacht Chair in Public International Law, Faculty of Law, Hebrew
University; Director in the Project on International Courts and Tribunals. The author
thanks his research assistant, Mr. Eran Sthoeger, for his excellent assistance.
1.

See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACrICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT 1920-2005, 1079-1080 (Brill Academic Pub. 2006).
2. Ad hoc judges are most commonly associated with the ICJ. Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 31, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. Yet,
other international courts and tribunals also allow for the appointment of ad hoc judges
where no member of the bench holds the nationality of the litigating state. See Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 17, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561, available at
European
documents/statute en.pdf;
http://www.itlos.org/documents-publications/
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 27, Nov. 24, 1950, available
at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/ Html/005.htm; American Convention on
Human Rights art. 55, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
3. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina, Case
ARB/03/17, $ 37 (ICSID Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Suez]; Republic of Poland v. Eureko,
[2007] R.G. 2007/AR/70 [Court of Appeal] (Belg.) [hereinafter Eureko].
4. See ROSENNE, supranote 1.
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previous professional contacts. This is because familiarity with the
designated arbitrator's legal philosophy and trust in her ability to
influence the views of the other members of the panel-two
important attributes of designated arbitrators in the eyes of the
appointing parties-are often founded upon these past contacts.
This article will argue that the institution of party-appointed
adjudicator should be understood as a consensual deviation from
the ordinary norms governing the operation of international
adjudicatory mechanisms. This deviation represents a trade-off
between two competing sets of values and interests; the first being
the parties' interests in the increased control over the course of
litigation facilitated by their ability to nominate adjudicators.
Increased party control entails the sacrifice of some degree of
judicial independence and impartiality of the appointed
adjudicators in exchange for improved confidence of the parties in
the adjudicative process. As a result, the parties have a greater
inclination to resort to adjudication. It would, therefore, be a
mistake to apply the tests of judicial independence and impartiality
developed for permanent national or international judges, or even
non-party-appointed arbitrators (sometimes referred to as
"neutral arbitrators")' to party-appointed adjudicators. Moreover,
such application might be counter-productive. Trying to "square
the circle" and encompass party-appointed adjudicators within the
compass of traditional notions of judicial independence and
impartiality might dilute these legal standards and reduce the
overall impact of ethical standards governing the work of the
judiciary (and non-party-appointed arbitrators).
In Part I, I will briefly introduce the recent decision of the
Brussels Court of Appeals in Eureko concerning the challenge to
the continued service of Judge Schwebel on a UNCITRAL arbitral
panel, as well as the recent ICSID tribunal decision in Suez
concerning the challenge to the service of Prof. Kaufmann-Kohler
on the arbitral panel. In Part II, I will offer some observations on
the raison d'etre of the institution of party-appointed adjudicator
5. But see Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984) ("the standards for disqualification of arbitrators
have been held to be less stringent than those for federal judges"). For a discussion, see W.
Michael Tupman, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International
Commercial Arbitration, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 26, 50 (1989); Catherine A. Rogers,
Regulating International Arbitrators:A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of

Conduct, 41 STAN. J INT'L L. 53, 56-57 (2005) ("the mirage of absolute judicial impartiality
becomes more distorted when it is superimposed onto the arbitrator").
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(party-appointed arbitrators and ad hoc judges) and explain its
inherent incompatibility with the ordinary rules and principles
governing the independence and impartiality of the international
judiciary. In doing so, I will use the Burgh House Principles-a
code of judicial ethics developed by an International Law
Association (ILA) Study Group-as a useful point of reference in
this regard. Finally, I will offer, in Part III, some suggestions as to
what could be expected from party-appointed adjudicators in
terms of judicial ethics.
I. Two RECENT DISQUALIFICATION CASES

A. Eureko
On October 29, 2007, the Brussels Court of Appeals rendered
its decision in an appeal against a lower court's decision.' The
decision dismissed the Polish government's request to disqualify
Judge Stephen Schwebel (the former President of the ICJ) from
sitting on a UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal in a case brought against
Poland by a Dutch company-Eureko BV.' The dispute revolved
around some unilateral measures taken by Poland, measures which
changed the operating terms of a recently privatized local
insurance corporation acquired by Eureko.8
On August 19, 2005, the UNCITRAL tribunal published its
partial award on the matter, holding that Poland's acts were
expropriatory in nature, violated its bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) obligations to treat investments in a fair and equitable
manner, and breached specific undertakings of the government
vis-d-vis Eureko.9 Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 2005, Poland
instituted proceedings before a Belgian Court of First Instance
(Belgium being the seat of the arbitration, and thus the procedural
forum authorized to supervise the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings). These proceedings were aimed at disqualifying
Judge Schwebel from participating in the second stage of the
proceedings in which the quantum of remedies was to be
assessed."0 Specifically, Poland alleged that in the summer of 2005,

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Eureko, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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around the time in which the partial award was issued, it learned
that Judge Schwebel had joined the international litigation
department of Sidley, Austin, Brown and Wood (SABW). There
he would serve as co-counsel representing the law firm in an
investment claim brought by Cargill, Inc. (a U.S. Corporation)
against Poland on the basis of the U.S.-Polish BIT (a treaty whose
content is generally similar to the Dutch-Polish BIT discussed in
Eureko)." Although vehemently denied by Judge Schwebel,
Poland argued that these facts raised certain doubt over the
precise nature of the relations between Judge Schwebel and
SABW.'2
In addition, Poland argued before the Court of Appeals that
Judge Schwebel's service as a co-counsel in the case of Vivendi v.
Argentina (together with SABW) put him in a "vertical conflict" in
the Eureko proceedings.'3 This was because the decision in Eureko
might serve as useful authority that Judge Schwebel could then use
in the course of the Vivendi proceedings. 4
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Polish motion and
affirmed the lower court's decision to reject the challenge to Judge
Schwebel's membership in the UNCITRAL tribunal." Although
the Court of Appeals accepted that Judge Schwebel may have had
some professional associations with SABW, it held that he clearly
maintained his independence from the firm and that there was no
reason to believe he was influenced in the exercise of his arbitral
functions by the firm's litigation interests.6 The fact that Judge
Schwebel and SABW had worked in the past for the same clients
did not create relations of dependence; nor should one attribute
any significance to the proximity of the offices of Judge Schwebel
and SABW."7 As for the allegations concerning the "vertical
11. Id. In its brief, Poland cited a press release by SABW announcing their
collaboration with Judge Schwebel in high profile international cases and a website
mentioning the involvement of Judge Schwebel in the Cargill case; it also produced
witness testimony to the effect that Judge Schwebel shares the same office space with
SABW. Finally, Poland alluded to Schwebel's conduct during the proceedings, and alleged
that it was unfavorable to Poland's litigation interests.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. For a similar holding on the limited significance of shared office arrangements,
see Amco Asia Corp. v. Indon., ICSID Case ARB/81/1, Decision on the Proposal to
Disqualify an Arbitrator, at 8 (June 24, 1982) (unreported), reprinted in W. Michael
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conflict" created by the participation of Judge Schwebel in the
UNCITRAL tribunal and the litigation team in Vivendi, they were
rejected by the Court of Appeals as devoid of merit. 8 Moreover,
the Court noted that these allegations, which were not raised at all
during the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, were
thus raised in an untimely fashion."
B. Suez
On October 22, 2007, another disqualification decision was
issued, this time by an ICSID tribunal.2 ' The case-Suez v.
Argentina-involved a dispute over the fate of a foreign
investment project in Argentina (a water distribution and waste
water treatment concession).2' On October 12, 2007, Argentina
requested that the tribunal disqualify the claimant's partyappointed arbitrator, Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, because
of her past service as an arbitrator in CAA & Vivendi v. Argentina.
Decided on August 20, 2007, that case dealt with another water
related investment in Argentina.22 According to Argentina, the
CAA award was seriously flawed, especially with regard to the
treatment of factual matters.23 This gave rise to concerns over the
impartiality of Prof. Kaufmann-Kohler, who supported the earlier
decision. 4
The
two
remaining
arbitrators
adjudicating
the
disqualification motion held that Argentina's motion was not

Tupman, Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Commercial
Arbitration, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 26, 44-45 (1989) [hereinafter Amco Asia Corp.].
18. Eureko, supra note 3.
19. Id. It is interesting to note that the Swedish Supreme Court decided on
Nov. 19, 2007 to nullify an award rendered in favor of an Ericsson subsidiary by a panel
chaired by Mr. Lind-the former Chief of the Swedish Supreme Court. After retiring, Mr.
Lind provided some consultancy services to the biggest law firm in Sweden, whose largest
client was Ericsson, and took office in that law firm's building. According to the Court,
this situation fell short of the requirements of independence under Swedish law. Although
this is a domestic arbitration case-not an international arbitration case-it may be
suggestive of higher standards applied with regard to the independence and impartiality of
the "neutral arbitrator," as opposed to party-appointed arbitrators. See Judgment by the
Swedish Supreme Court in Case No. T 2448-06, Rendered in November 2007: "The Lind
Case", THE SCC INSTITUTE, availableat http://www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared-files/
artikelarkiv/siar_20073the-lind-case.pdf.
20. Suez, supra note 3, $ 37.
21. Id. 2.
22. Id. 12.
23. Id. 13.
24. Id.
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presented with a sufficient degree of promptness and that, in all
events, it was lacking in substance:
[D]oes the fact that an arbitrator or a judge has made a decision
that a party in one case interprets as against its interests mean
that such judge or arbitrator cannot be impartial to that party in
another case? Further, does the fact that a judge or arbitrator
had made a determination of law or a finding of fact in one case
mean that such judge cannot decide the law and the facts
impartially in another case? We believe that the answer to all
[both] questions is no. A finding of an arbitrator's or a judge's
lack of impartiality requires far stronger evidence than that
such arbitrator participated in a unanimous decision with two
other arbitrators in a case in which a party in that case is
currently a party in a case now being heard by that arbitrator or
judge. To hold otherwise would have serious negative
consequences for any adjudicatory system."
In other words, the tribunal was not persuaded that the
participation of an arbitrator in a past arbitral decision
.unfavorable to the litigation interests of one of the parties to the
subsequent case created an objective appearance of bias against
that party.26

II. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATORS
The two aforementioned decisions are hardly exceptional and
resemble other decisions issued in the course of disqualification
proceedings.27 Still, they do underline some of the unique problems

25. Id. 36.
26. The tribunal also noted that the cases are different in their factual and legal
bases-in particular Suez, unlike CAA, involved necessity-type arguments relating to the
Argentinean financial crisis. Id. 37.
27. The most prominent ICSID case to date, where a similar issue had arisen is Amco
Asia v. Indonesia, where a challenge was made to the service of a party-appointed
arbitrator, on the grounds that in the past he consulted with the appointing party and
worked in a law firm that used to share office space with the claimant's law firm.
According to the two remaining (and unchallenged) arbitrators, although the same
standards of independence and impartiality apply to all arbitrators, an arbitrator ought not
to be -disqualified "for the only reason that some relationship existed between that person
and a party, whatever the character-even professional-or the extent of said relations."
Amco Asia Corp., supra note 17. For an example of an unsuccessful attempt to challenge
an arbitral award on the ground that a party-appointed arbitrator was embroiled in a
"vertical conflict" (direct involvement of the arbitrator in a company that filed a related
claim against the same respondent party), see Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v.
Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 480. F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Telekom Malay Berhad
v. Ghana, Rechtbank's-Gravenhage [District Court], The Hague, Oct. 18, 2004 (Neth.),
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related to the institution of the party-appointed adjudicator.
Specifically, these cases highlight the inherent tension between the
principle of judicial independence and impartiality, and notions of

personal trust and professional predisposition underlying the
selection of party-appointed adjudicators. Although often hard to
prove, it is possible that a specific party-appointed arbitrator (or
ad hoc judge) was selected precisely because she argued in other
past or pending cases in favor of specific legal theories. It is also
possible that an arbitrator in one case was appointed in a
subsequent case by reason of the factual and legal conclusions she
reached in the first-in-time decision that may be conducive to the
litigation interests of the designating party. Furthermore, the
parties' personal acquaintances and past associations with the
designated arbitrators can be instrumental in creating the
necessary degree of trust in her capabilities. That trust may
generate, in turn, the comfort level that the parties need in order
to submit their disputes to international arbitration.28 Moreover, in
cases involving close-knit professional communities, it is almost
impossible to completely avoid appointing prior acquaintances or
associates unless the parties are willing to appoint arbitrators with
no relevant experience or prior knowledge of the topics at hand.29

reprinted in 2 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT (a "vertical conflict" between an arbitrator's duty
to impartially decide the case before it and his role as counsel in another pending case
involving similar issues should lead to disqualification).
28. See Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International
Controversies:Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 59, 62 (1995) ("If, as elaborated below,
one of the principal functions of a party-appointed arbitrator is to give confidence in the
process to the parties and their counsel, some basis for that confidence needs to be
established. Sometimes that confidence can be based on mutual acquaintances, without
direct personal contact; some potential arbitrators become well-known through published
writings, lectures, committee work, or public office. Others are not so well-known, and I
understand that lawyers or clients or both want to have a firsthand look. I think, however,
some restraint should be shown by both sides.").
29. For a similar argument, see Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84 ("[Tlhe small
size and population of an industry might require a relaxation of judicial scrutiny [of
arbitrator impartiliaty]."); Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia, 480 F. Supp. at 358
("The maritime community in New York is relatively small, and closely knit. There are not
many experienced maritime arbitrators. Commercial relationships in the industry
interweave and overlap; the leaders of the industry come in constant contact with each
other; on occasion disputes, arbitration, and litigation result. It would be disruptive of the
resolution of maritime disputes by arbitration in this City to disqualify an arbitrator simply
because a party to an arbitration proclaims, in circumstances such as these, 'the
appearance of bias."').
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A. The Raison d'ttre of the Institution of Party-Appointed
Adjudicator
In order to further analyze the two aforementioned decisions,
one ought to spend more time considering the unique role of
party-appointed adjudicators. If, as I believe is the case, their
functions are significantly different than those of permanent
judges or non-party-appointed adjudicators, then the application
of international rules and principles of judicial independence and
impartiality to them may differ as well. In other words, a need may
arise to adapt to the principle of judicial independence and
impartiality so as to meet the particular needs associated with the
institution of the party-appointed adjudicator.
The limited scope of this article does not permit a
comprehensive historical survey of the evolution of the partyappointed adjudicator within international dispute settlements.
Hence, it is limited to a few rudimentary observations on the
development of international arbitration.
Before the nineteenth century, inter-state arbitration tended
to be political in nature." This meant that disputes were submitted
to resolution before a neutral ruler or another senior functionary,
who typically settled the dispute through issuing an unreasoned
award.31 Throughout the nineteenth century, international
arbitration became more and more legalized,32 yet this
transformation was gradual in nature." Initially, arbitrations were
typically conducted through a two-stage process.' In the first stage,
party-appointed arbitrators or commissioners would aim to find a
mutually acceptable solution to the dispute on the basis of legal
and extra-legal considerations.35 If they failed to reach agreement,
an umpire would be summoned for the second stage of the
proceedings and asked to decide the case.3 6

30. See J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL FOx, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PRACrICE 3 (1959); J.G. MERRILS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 89 (3d ed.

1998).
31. MERRILS,supra note 30, at 89.
32. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100, 520 (Michael
Byers trans., Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. 2000) (1984).
33. Id.
34. MERRILS, supra note 30, at 88-89.

35. Id.
36. Id.
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Later on, partly for reasons of procedural expediency and
partly for reasons of judicial propriety,37 single panels comprised of
a mixture of party and non-party-appointed arbitrators were
created." Party-appointed arbitrators originated as part agents,
part adjudicators. 9 They essentially served as the "long arm" of the
parties to which broad dispute resolution powers were delegated,
and under this new configuration, the role of party-appointed
arbitrators underwent a transformation to relatively independent
dispute-settlers."0 The institution of the ad hoc judge grew out of
this early twentieth century configuration of international
arbitration, 1 and the ad hoc judge serves as a constant reminder of
the influence of international arbitration on the evolution of
adjudication.
What is the modern role of party-appointed adjudicators
then? In a way, they preserve some delegated functions on behalf
of the appointing party. They no longer serve as "seconds" or
"partisans once removed from the controversy" 2 authorized to
formulate a settlement on behalf of the parties. Nor do they serve
as party representatives who act for and on behalf of their
appointing parties.3 Nonetheless, they still serve the parties'
interests in two important ways. First, they monitor the proper and

37. See, e.g., Theodore Marburg, The Washington Meeting of the American Society for
the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 5 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 181, 188 (1911)
(commissioners, unlike agents, are bound by no ethical codes in their dealings with the
umpire).
38. MERRILS, supra note 30, at 88-89.
39. Id.
40. Id. Marburg, supra note 37, at 182.
41. MERRILS, supra note 30, at 88-89.
42. Stef Shipping Corp. v. Norris Grain Co., 209 F. Supp. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
43. See Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J.
325, 409 (Sept. 13) (Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) ("[The right of parties to
appoint ad hoc judges] has led many to assume that an ad hoc judge must be regarded as a
representative of the State that appoints him and, therefore, as necessarily precommitted
to the position that that State may adopt. That assumption is, in my opinion, contrary to
principle and cannot be accepted."). Judge Schwebel points out, however, that nonnational judges may also be influenced by the positions of litigant states who belong to the
same region or political grouping as her state of nationality. Stephen M. Schwebel,
National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International Court of Justice, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 889, 893-94 (1999). The research on this point is inconclusive. See Edith
Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 123, 129-33 (Lori F. Damrosch
ed., 1987); Adam M. Smith, "JudicialNationalism" in InternationalLaw: National Identity
and JudicialAutonomy at the ICJ, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 197, 220-21 (2005) (both researchers
finding no clear link between voting records and national groupings).
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fair conduct of the adjudicative process.' Second, they ensure that
the appointing parties' positions and interests are properly
understood and considered by the tribunal." On a more abstract
level, they also help to maintain the confidence of the parties in
the adjudicative process and preserve some, albeit modest, degree
of control over the process.'
This, however, is not the complete picture. In reality, parties
afforded the power to appoint an adjudicator do hope to impact
the final outcome of the adjudicatory process through appointing a
person sympathetic to them or their case. 7 To think otherwise
would be absurd. If nothing else, classic "prisoner dilemma"
dynamics, the fear that the other party would appoint a favorable
adjudicator, would lead to such an outcome.'
Even when viewed from this perspective, judicial
independence and impartiality may still have a certain strategic
value. A party-appointed adjudicator may be more effective in
terms of impacting the outcome of the adjudicatory process if she
is perceived as independent and impartial. 9 This explains the
increasing tendency of parties to designate distinguished jurists
who do not share their nationality as party-appointed
adjudicators." This trend undermines, however, the traditional role
44. Lowenfeld, supra note 28, at 65.
45. Id. See also Proc~s-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Advisory Committee of
Jurists 528-29 (July 14, 1920); Application of the Genocide Convention, 1993 I.C.J. at 409
(Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
46. See Report of the Informal Allied Committee cited in ROSENNE, supra note 1, at
1081; Schwebel, supra note 43. For an argument positing that control is more conducive to
compliance with adjudicatory decisions than independence, see Eric A. Posner & John C.
Yoo, JudicialIndependence in InternationalTribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
47. Cf In the Matter of the Arbitration between Astoria Medical Group and Health
Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 182 N.E.2d 85, 87-88 (N.Y. 1962) ("The right to appoint
one's own arbitrator ...would be of little moment were it to comprehend solely the choice
of a neutral. It becomes a valued right, which parties will bargain for and litigate over, only
if it involves a choice of one believed to be sympathetic to his position or favorably
disposed to him"); Johnson v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 147 So. 2d 247, 248 (La. Ct. App.
1962) ("It would be strange indeed if an interested party, with the right to select an
arbitrator, would select one antagonistic to it"); Rogers, supra note 5, at 74.
48. For a comparable dilemma-i.e., how is one party-appointed arbitrator to behave
when the other party-appointed arbitrator behaves in a partisan fashion-see Richard M.
Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Arbitration: The
Experience of the Iran-U.S.Claims Tribunal,1 TRANSNAT'L LAW 253, 262 (1988).
49. Lowenfeld, supra note 28, at 60 (over-zealous party-appointed arbitrators lose
credibility with the other members of the tribunal).
50. Note that, until 1936, the PCIJ Rules required states to nominate nationals for
service as ad hoc judges (although this rule had not always been observed in the practice
prior to the elimination of this requirement). Schwebel, supra note 43, at 896. Only in the
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of party-appointed arbitrators as the best-situated member of the
tribunal to elucidate the appointing party's arguments and their
5 But this surely provides a weak basis
factual and legal contexts.for promoting judicial independence and impartiality: the parties
will respect those principles only if they appear to serve their
particular litigation interests in a specific case. Even when the
parties acknowledge the utility of perceived independence and
impartiality, they are unlikely to select adjudicators whose
dispositions towards the parties and issues are completely
unpredictable.52 Indeed, current statistical analysis of IC
judgments shows that in some ninety percent of the cases ad hoc
judges vote with the party that appointed them (at the same time,
the other judges on the bench vote with their country of
nationality "only" some seventy to eighty-five percent of the
time)."3 These figures confirm our intuition that party-appointed
adjudicators are pre-disposed to vote in favor of their appointing
party.
So the fundamental dilemma remains unresolved-certainly,
judicial propriety and even utilitarian considerations would
support subjecting party-appointed adjudicators to the same high
ethical standards to which permanent judges and non-party-

1978 ICJ Rules was the practice of appointing non-national as ad hoc judges explicitly
acknowledged. Rules of Court (1978) art. 35(1), 2007 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 91, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0.
51. Lowenfeld, supra note 28, at 65 (party-appointed arbitrators serve as "translators"
and explain the legal culture of the appointing party to the other arbitrators).
52. See Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of
Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 624-25 (2005).
53. For two recent statistical analyses, see id. at 615; Smith, supra note 43, at 218. For
an earlier study, see I1Ro Suh, Voting Behaviorof NationalJudges in InternationalCourts,
63 AM. J. INT'L L. 224 (1969). The link between nationality and voting record is hardly
surprising. Already in 1927, the drafters of the revised PCIJ Rules were acutely aware of
the likelihood that national judges would lean towards their state of nationality.
Permanent Court of Int'l Justice, Fourth Annual Report of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, 1927-1928 P.C.I.J. ANN. REP. (ser. E) No. 4, at 75 (1928) ("Of all
influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more
subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred
and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to
spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's]
Statute frankly recognizes and deals with."). See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCrION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 215 (1933); but see Schwebel,
supra note 43, at 893, 895-96 (noting that national and ad hoc judges in the PCIJ and ICJ
have sometimes voted against the interests of their state of nationality or appointing
state).
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appointed arbitrators are subject;' however, such standards are
likely to be systematically bypassed by sophisticated parties and
adjudicators.55 Moreover, such efforts might prove to be counterproductive. Attempts to bring party-appointed adjudicators within
the purview of the traditional tests of judicial independence and
impartiality could result in diluting these standards altogether.56
As the Eureko and Suez cases may illustrate, such concerns
are not unfounded.57 In both cases, the court held that arbitrators,
whose substantive positions on key aspects of the pending disputes
could have been reasonably surmised from their past and
concurrent involvement in comparable proceedings, should not be
disqualified." While one can agree with the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals and the ICSID tribunal in regard to partyappointed adjudicators, it would have been less appropriate to
designate as non-party-appointed adjudicators individuals whose
position on specific issues can be accurately predicted from their
past professional records. Unless the institution of the partyappointed adjudicator is abolished or radically changed 59-a feat
that presently seems unrealistic and probably undesirable (at least
from a perspective which respects party autonomy)'- ethical

54. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp., supra note 17, at 6 ("[A]n absolute impartiality of the
sole arbitrator or, as the case may be, of all the members of an arbitral tribunal, is
required, and it is right to say that no distinction can and should be made, as to the
standard of impartiality, between members of an arbitral tribunal, whatever the method of
their appointment."); Tupman, supra note 5, at 45.
55. See, e.g., Mosk, supra note 48, at 260-61.
56. See, e.g., id. at 263 (advocating flexibility in the application of ethical standards in
arbitration, without distinguishing between party-appointed and non-party-appointed
arbitrators).
57. See generally Suez, supra note 3; Eureko, supra note 3.
58. Suez, supra note 3,
36; see Damon Vis-Dunbar and Luke Eric Peterson,
Arbitration Watch, Investment Treaty News, November 15, 2007, available at
http://www.investmenttreatynews.com.
59. For a call to abolish the institution of party-appointed arbitrators, see Seth H.
Lieberman, Something's Rotten in the State of Party-Appointed Arbitration: Healing
ADR's Black Eye that is "Nonneutral Neutrals", 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215,
241-45 (2004).
60. For a comparable analysis, see Davis v. Forshee, 34 Ala. 107, 109 (1859)
("Arbitration, in this State, is never compulsory. Parties voluntarily elect this mode of
adjustment, and appoint their own arbitrators. We know no reason why persons related to
suitors within the fourth degree, may not, if chosen, act as arbitrators, and make a binding
award. Volenti non fit injuria.").
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standards specially tailored for party-appointed adjudicators might
need to be developed."
B. Application of the Burgh House Principlesto
Party-AppointedAdjudicators
The Burgh House Principles-a recent ILA-supported
initiative to lay down some non-binding ethical principles that
could govern the conduct of international judges-have explicitly
refrained from tackling head-on the problems presented by the
institution of the party-appointed adjudicator. The initiative stated
that the principles elaborated there would apply to ad hoc judges
and arbitrators only "as appropriate. ' Indeed, even a cursory
look at the Burgh House Principles reveals their apparent
incompatibility with a number of the features characterizing the
status of a party-appointed adjudicator.
0 Security of tenure63-This entire notion, which is one
of the hallmarks of judicial independence, is
inapplicable to ad hoc judges and party-appointed
arbitrators. As a result, party-appointed adjudicators
are far more dependent on their appointing parties for
future appointments than permanent judges.'
limited
temporal
activity" - The
* Extra-judicial
duration of service of ad hoc judges or arbitrators
renders it probable that such individuals would also be
actively engaged, as practitioners or academics, in
work related to the topics they may address as
adjudicators. Hence, the potential for their finding
themselves in what Argentina referred to in Eureko as
"vertical conflicts" is considerable. The uneasiness
61. This was implicitly accepted by the ICSID tribunal in Amco Asia Corp., where it
was held that although the same standards of independence and impartiality apply, in
principle, to all arbitrators, the possibility of party-appointments presumes some
acquaintance between the arbitrator and appointing party. Amco Asia Corp., supra
note 17, at 7.
62. INT'L LAW ASS'N [ILA], BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES ON INDEPENDENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY (2005), pmbl., available at www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/

burgh-final_21204.pdf.
63. Id. at princ. 3.
64. This predicament also affects the independence of non-party-appointed
arbitrators, but to a. lesser degree: whereas all arbitrators are measured by the quality of
their work, party-appointed arbitrators are also expected to satisfy, to some degree or
other, the specific interests of the appointing party, if they seek to be re-appointed.
65.

BURGH HOUSE PRINCIPLES, supra note 62, at princ. 8.
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about the dual role of party-appointed adjudicators
has led the ICJ to introduce a Practice Direction that
encourages the parties not to select judges ad hoc from
among counsels who have appeared before the court
in the previous three years, and not to appoint judges
(including judges ad hoc) as counsels before the
expiration of three years.' While this may help
alleviate perceived impropriety in the ICJ, it does not
fully resolve the larger problems of the "vertical
conflicts" of party-appointed adjudicators. The
Practice Directions place no limits on representation
parties before any judicial forum other than the
of the
67
ICJ.

Past links to a party'-Since the nomination and/or
appointment of adjudicators (including permanent
judges) is often based on previous acquaintances, it
may be futile to insist on the complete absence of past
links between the parties and their designated
adjudicators. Even the Burgh House Principles suggest
a mere cooling-off period of three years in which the
judges do not work for the parties.69 But given the
unique degree of trust placed in party-appointed
adjudicators and the greater flexibility of arbitral
proceedings, it may be questionable as to whether this
three-year period provides a realistic standard in many
cases.
too, the limited
* Post-service limitations 7 -Here
duration of service of ad hoc adjudicators renders
these types of limitations largely unrealistic or
irrelevant for most party-appointed adjudicators.
Here, it already appears that many of the basic rules and
principles that sustain judicial independence and impartiality are
either unrealistic or irrelevant for party-appointed adjudicators. In
the next and final part of the article, I propose to develop a
"

66. Practice Direction VII, 2007 I.C.J. Acts & Docs 165, available at http://www.icjcij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=4&p3=0.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at princ. 13.
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III. DIFFERENT STANDARDS?
The short aforementioned survey suggests that the ordinary
rules and principles governing judicial independence and
impartiality might be inadequate to govern the conduct of partyappointed adjudicators. Applying the same norms to partyappointed adjudicators may create a system of legal ethics
divorced from reality, and have the potential to dilute the more
robust rules and principles that could, and should, govern the
conduct of non-party-appointed adjudicators.
A compromise formula should be sought. While judicial
independence is an indispensable element of the judicial function,
its application to party-appointed adjudicators necessitates some
degree of flexibility. The personal trust underlying many
appointments of party-appointed adjudicators presumes some
form of past relations or acquaintances. Hence, I would support
the "manifest lack of independence" standard proposed by the
Amco Asia ICSID tribunal as the appropriate standard to govern
the disqualification of party-appointed adjudicators.' Under this
standard, neither past relations, nor peripheral or indirect ongoing
relations between the party and the adjudicator appointed should,
as a rule, lead to disqualification.72 This is particularly so because
the appointment to serve on an arbitration tribunal or court
constitutes a strong form of relationship that eclipses older or less
significant forms of relations (and creates in itself some degree of
dependency relating to possible future appointments, which
eclipses weaker forms of dependency). At the same time, strong
and direct ongoing relations between the adjudicator and the
appointing party (including the existence of ex parte
communications between the two), should, as a rule, lead to
disqualification unless the opposing party waives its objections to
the continued service of the party-appointed adjudicator."

71. Amco Asia Corp., supra note 17, at 8.
72. Id.
73. For an example of a successful motion for disqualification on the basis of the
appointed arbitrator active service as a lobbyist on issues relating to the relations between
the states involved in the dispute, see S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, at
paras. 25-29 (Nov. 13, 2000).
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The application of the principle of judicial impartiality to
party-appointed adjudicators may prove to be an even more
delicate matter. Since party-appointed adjudicators are often
nominated because of their presumed dispositions" (which render
them, at least, somewhat partial), the application of stringent
standards of judicial impartiality to party-appointed adjudicators
may be a hopeless task. The actual dynamics of the appointment
process are such that they are likely to give rise to chronic
partiality concerns. Unfortunately, the ability of external bodies to
monitor
such
"internal"
dispositions -unlike
external
manifestations of dependence-is limited.75 In addition, the costsboth in terms of material costs and interference with party
autonomy and level of comfort in the process-might be
prohibitively high. 6 So, arguably, the development of looser
standards of impartiality for party-appointed adjudicators (e.g.,
lack of serious bias and good faith) would be more appropriate
here too.
Significantly, the idea that different rules of ethics should
apply to party-appointed and non-party-appointed adjudicators
has considerable support in domestic U.S. law and practice.'
Courts and commentators in the United States have been willing
to acknowledge that party-appointed arbitrators may be
"sympathetic" to the case of the party that appointed them-a
euphemism for a permissible degree of "partiality."' Indeed, the
1977 ABA/AAA Code of Ethics explicitly stated that partyappointed arbitrators "may be predisposed toward the party who
appointed them, but in all other respects are obligated to act in
good faith and with integrity and fairness"' 9 and are expected to

74. See Posner & de Figueiredo, supra note 52, at 624-25.

75. Tupman, supra note 5 at 49.
76. Id. at 49-50.
77. See generally David J. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators-Not the
Three Monkeys, 30 DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2004).

78. Id. at 51.
79. AM. BAR ASS'N, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, Cannon VII(A) (1977). Note that the same

rule also relaxed the party-appointed arbitrators' disclosure obligations, limited the ability
to disqualify them and tolerated most past relationships between the arbitrator and her
appointing party. Some U.S. State arbitration codes also distinguish between partyappointed and non-party-appointed arbitrators. See, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7511(b)(1)(ii)
(2008). For a discussion of the differences between State law and Federal law on this issue,
see Tupman, supra note 5, 29-30.
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pass "independent judgment."' Yet, it should be noted that the
provisions on "non-neutral" arbitrators have been strongly
criticized by influential members of the bar as "embarrassing," 1
and such provisions have been omitted from the more recent 2004
version of the Code.' The distinction between party-appointed
and non-party-appointed arbitrators is also missing from the AAA
and CPR International Arbitration Rules, 3 and from the
UNCITRAL and ICC Rules of Arbitration.'
Ultimately, the policy decision that needs to be made is which
standard to choose. High, utopian, ethical standards will set
laudable ethical goals but may have little impact on the actual
conduct of adjudicatory proceedings and may inevitably result in
either diluted interpretations of the standards or ineffective
implementation of those standards. A more nuanced approach,
however, will acknowledge the functional distinctions between
different types of adjudicators and set varying ethical standards for
differently
situated
individuals.'
Since
party-appointed
adjudicators have a unique role in adjudication processes, a certain
relaxation of the requirements of judicial independence and
judicial impartiality with respect to such adjudicators is justified.
Such a move would not undercut judicial propriety; to the
contrary, it would prevent the liberal standards applied in
decisions such as Eureko and Suez, from being used in cases
80. 1977 AAA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 79, at Cannon VII(E) (leaving
unhindered the general rule of independence in Cannon V(B)).

81. Branson, supra note 77, at 44; James H. Carter, Improving Life with the PartyAppointed Arbitrator.Clearer Conduct Guidelines for "Nonneutrals", 11 AM. REV. INT'L.

ARB. 295,304-05 (2000).
82. AM. ARB. ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (2004).
83. AM. ARB. ASS'N, INT'L CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION [ICDR],
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES R-2, art. 7 (2007), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994; INT'L INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION &
RESOLUTION, RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES, Rule 7.1 (2007). See also David J. Branson, Commentary: Ethics for

International Arbitrators, 3 ARB. INT'L 72 (1987). For a discussion of the distinction
between the perceived role of party-appointed arbitrators in domestic U.S. arbitrations
and international arbitrations, see Mosk, supra note 48, at 256-63.
84. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Arbitration Rules, G.A.
Res. 31/98 (1978), at arts. 9-10, http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/texts/arbitration/arbrules/arb-rules.pdf.
85. For an analogous juxtaposition between "perfectionism" and "practicality"
offered by the former PCIJ judge, Prof. Manley Hudson, see Session d'Aix-en-Provence,
45 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 459, 465 (1954).
86. Id.
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dealing with the independence and impartiality of non-partyappointed adjudicators. Since party-appointed adjudicators
ultimately neutralize one another,' defending the integrity and
legitimacy of the adjudicatory process by focusing on non-partyappointed members and applying the strictest ethical standards to
those members, is arguably more crucial than striving in vain to
raise the ethical standards governing the service of partyappointed adjudicators.
IV. CONCLUSION

To expect party-appointed adjudicators to comply with the
same standards of non-party-appointed adjudicators, namely those
of judicial independence and impartiality, is both unrealistic and
counter-productive. Disputing parties may elect to create a special
procedure which responds to higher ethical standards. In this
situation, the parties may accept some limitations on their
autonomy and freedom of selection of adjudicators.' But, in the
absence of such conscious choice, it would be far more sensible to
strive for more flexible standards (some degree of independence
and impartiality) than to overreach and set the threshold too high.
Such flexibility would not violate judicial ethics; it would simply
acknowledge the different functions of different adjudicative
processes while also respecting the choice of the parties to engage
in such processes.
Given the voluntary nature of international dispute
settlements, ethical standards that are flexible enough to
accommodate the parties' interests in maintaining some control
over the adjudicatory process is preferable to an ethical
straitjacket that might alienate the parties from the process and
limit, in effect, their choice of dispute settlement procedures. Thus,
as noted by Catherine Rogers, the debate is not really about
judicial ethics; it is about the different adjudicative functions
between party-appointed and non-party-appointed adjudicators.89

87. ROSENNE, supra note 1, at 1081.

88. For an analogous rule, see 1977 AAA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 79, at Canon
VII ("the two party-appointed arbitrators should be considered non-neutrals unless both
parties inform the arbitrators that all three arbitrators are to be neutral or unless the
contract, the applicable arbitration rules, or any governing law requires that all three
arbitrators be neutral").
89. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 113-17.

